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Abstract—This paper extends the weak secrecy results of Liu
et al. for broadcast channels with two confidential messages to
strong secrecy. Our results are based on an extension of the
techniques developed by Hou and Kramer on bounding Kullback-
Leibler divergence in context of resolvability and effective secrecy.
Index Terms—Information theoretic security, resolvability,
strong secrecy, broadcast channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Based on the pioneering work of Shannon [1], Wyner
[2] determined the secrecy capacity of a class of wiretap
channels. Wyner’s work has been generalized by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [3] to the non-degraded broadcast channel with a single
confidential message for one user and a common message
intended for both users. The confidential message has to be
kept secret from the other user, while both of them decode the
common message. A variant of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s model
with two confidential messages and no common message was
first studied by Liu et al. in [4] for a discrete memoryless
channel and later for the Gaussian case in [5]. An inner and
outer bound on the secrecy region can be found in [4].
The secrecy criterion used in [2–4], is the normalized
mutual information between the message and the output distri-
bution of the user regarded as the eavesdropper. This security
criterion, called weak secrecy, delivers a very restricted secu-
rity against eavesdropping attacks as was shown by Maurer
in [6]. An unnormalized definition of secrecy, called strong
secrecy, was proposed in [6] and large parts of previous work
was extended from weak to strong secrecy (e.g. [6], [7], [8],
and, etc.). In this paper we extend the inner bound of [4]
from weak to strong secrecy. Along the proof we extend the
method of Hou and Kramer [9] based on even stronger notion
of effective secrecy to this scenario. More precisely we prove,
in addition to strong secrecy, a stealthy communication (i.e. the
presence of meaningful communication is hidden) is possible.
A. Notation
We use capital letters for random variables (RV). If X
is a RV then x is used to refer to an observation of X .
Sets are denoted by X and P(X ) stands for the set of
probability distributions defined on the (finite set) X . For
We present detailed proofs in the extended versions of this work.
the RVs X1, . . . , XK with values in X1, . . . ,XK we write
X1 − X2 − · · · − XK if they form a Markov chain. The
symbol x stands for xn := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn. The mutual
information between the RV’s A and B is denoted by I(A,B),
while H(A) and H(A|B) are entropy of A and conditional
entropy of A given B, respectively. Probability mass function
of X is PX(x) or in short P (x) while probability of an event
E is denoted by Pr(E). Kullback-Leibler divergence of two
probability distributions P,Q defined on set A is given by,
D(P‖Q) :=
{∑
a∈A P (a) log
P (a)
Q(a) if P ≪ Q
+∞ if P 6≪ Q
(1)
where P ≪ Q means that P (a) = 0 whenever Q(a) = 0
a ∈ A. The typical set of sequences xn ∈ Xn for RV X and
ǫ > 0 is denoted by T nǫ (PX) as defined in [10]. We will freely
use the properties of typical sets from [10].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a broadcast scenario consisting of a sender (S)
and two receivers. We assume that all channels are discrete
memoryless with finite input alphabet X , and finite output
alphabets Y1 and Y2. The conditional probability distribution
governing the discrete memoryless broadcast channel (DM-
BCC) is given by
P (y1,y2|x) =
n∏
i=1
P (y1i, y2i|xi), (2)
where, x = xn ∈ Xn, yt = ynt = (yt1, . . . , ytn) ∈ Ynt , and
t ∈ {1, 2}.
The stochastic encoder at the sender is defined to be,
f :M1 ×M2 → P(X
n) (3)
with, ∑
x∈Xn
f(x|m1,m2) = 1 ∀m1 ∈M1, m2 ∈ M2 (4)
where M1 := {1, . . . ,M1} and M2 := {1, . . . ,M2} are the
message sets for receiver 1 and 2, respectively. The decoder
at the tth node, t ∈ {1, 2}, is defined as
gt : Y
n
t →Mt. (5)
Definition 1 (Strong Secrecy [6]): For every ǫ > 0 there is
a non-negative integer N(ǫ) such that for all n ≥ N(ǫ),
I(W1;Y
n
2 |W2) ≤ ǫ (6)
I(W2;Y
n
1 |W1) ≤ ǫ (7)
where the RVs W1 and W2 are distributed uniformly over M1
and M2, respectively and the mutual information values are
computed with respect to the distribution
PW1W2Y n1 Y n2 (m1,m2,y1,y2) =
1
M1
1
M2
∑
x∈Xn
f(xn|m1,m2)P (y1,y2|x),
with the stochastic encoder given in (3).
The probability of error at each node t ∈ {1, 2} is
Pne t =
1
M1M2
∑
(m1,m2)∈M1×M2
P [gt(y
n
t ) 6= mt|(m1,m2) is sent],
Definition 2: A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable,
if for every ǫ′ > 0, ǫ > 0, δ > 0, there exists a code
(M1,M2, n, Pne 1, Pne 2) for sufficiently large n ,in addition to
(6) and (7), we have
Pne t ≤ ǫ
′ and 1
n
logMt ≥ Rt − δ, t ∈ {1, 2}.
Remark 1: The above definition provides a strong condition
on security. More details are given in section III-C where we
show that even stronger notion of secrecy based on stealth can
be achieved.
III. STRONG SECRECY FOR BROADCAST CHANNELS
In this section we present an achievable secure rate region
with strong secrecy criterion for a DMBCC. The following
theorem summarizes our results:
Theorem 1: The rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable, in the
sense of Definition 2, for DMBCC with confidential messages
and strong secrecy criterion, if
0 ≤R1, 0 ≤ R2
R1 <I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U)− I(V1;V2|U)
R2 <I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U)− I(V1;V2|U)
where the information quantities are computed with respect
to some probability distributions PU,V1,V2,X,Y1,Y2 such that
Markov chain condition U−(V1, V2)−X−(Y1, Y2) holds and
X and (Y1, Y2) are connected via the given broadcast channel.
The auxiliary RVs U, V1 and V2 take values in finite sets U ,V1
and V2. 1
Proof: The proof, which consists of two parts, achiev-
ability and secrecy, unfolds in the following subsections. The
achievablity proof is based on techniques developed in [11, 12]
and extends those devoted to secrecy developed in [9] for the
wiretap channel to the present setting.
1The cardinalities of U ,V1,V2 can be bounded by the Ahlswede-Ko¨tner
technique. We shall provide this in the journal version of this manuscript
A. Coding scheme
Remark 2: In order to simplify our notation we will drop
the auxiliary random variable U in the following proof. It can
be included into the proof via standard arguments [13, 14].
For each mt ∈ {1, . . . , 2nRt}, st ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR
′
t}, and kt ∈
{1, . . . , 2nRco}, t ∈ {1, 2}, we draw independently sequences
vt(mt, st, kt) according to Pn(vt) =
∏n
i=1 P (vt,i).
Let 0 < ǫ < ǫ′ < ǫ′′. For (m1,m2) and (s1, s2) find a pair
(k1, k2) such that
(v1(m1, s1, k1),v2(m2, s2, k2)) ∈ T
n
ǫ (PV1V2).
If there is no such a pair choose (k1, k2) = (1, 1). Then select
a sequence x(m1,m2, s1, s2) ∈ Xn with
(v1(m1, s1, k1),v2(m2, s2, k2),x(m1,m2, s1, s2))
∈ T nǫ′ (PV1V2X).
Encoding: To transmit (m1,m2) select uniformly at random
a pair (s1, s2) and send x(m1,m2, s1, s2).
Decoding: Upon receiving yt decoder, t ∈ {1, 2}, declares
(mt, st) is sent if it is unique pair such that
(vt(mt, st, kt),yt) ∈ T
n
ǫ′′(PVtYt) (8)
B. Error Analysis
The error analysis is carried out using standard arguments.
Using the mutual covering lemma, packing lemma, and the
properties of the typical sequences (cf. for example [10]) we
obtain
Rco > I(V1;V2) and R1 +R′1 +Rco < I(V1;Y1). (9)
and
lim
n→∞
Pne t = 0 t ∈ {1, 2}
exponentially fast.
From (9) we have
R1 +R
′
1 < I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;V2) (10)
and by symmetry,
R2 +R
′
2 < I(V2;Y2)− I(V1;V2). (11)
The bounds on R′1 and R′2 are derived in the following
subsection.
C. Strong Secrecy Criterion
Remark 3: For the secrecy analysis we drop the random
variable U for the sake of notational simplicity. It can be
introduced, if desired via standard arguments at the end of
the proof [3, 9].
Before we further continue, we define a deterministic
function φτ on pairs {v1(m1, s1, k1)}2
nRco
k1=1
×
{v2(m2, s2, k2)}
2nRco
k2=1
that returns a pair (k1, k2) such
that
(v1(m1, s1, k1),v2(m2, s2, k2)) ∈ T
n
ǫ (PV1,V2). (12)
In the case that there are many such pairs, we choose one
arbitrarily. However, if there are no such pairs, the function
φτ returns (1,1). From now on, we denote the codeword pairs
simply (v1(m1, s1),v2(m2, s2)) based on selection function
φτ .
We extend the framework in [9, 15] to find a condition that
bounds
D(PW1,Y2|v2 ||PW1Q
n
Y2|v2
) ≤ ξ (13)
where the left hand side is known as the effective secrecy,
ξ > 0 is arbitrarily small and
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2) :=
1
M1
J1∑
s1=1
1
J1
Pn(y2|v1(m1, s1),v2(m2, s2)),
and further QnY2|v2 is distribution of Y
n
2 given v2 while no
meaningful message is transmitted for W1,
QnY2|V2(y2|v2) =
∑
v1
PnV1(v1)P
n
Y2|V1,V2
(y2|v1,v2) (14)
and finally, PW1 is distribution of W1. We can further expand
(13) as
D(PW1,Y2|v2 ||PW1Q
n
Y2|v2
)
=
∑
m1,y2
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2)
log
(
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2)
QnY2|v2(y2|v2)PW1 (m1)
)
=
∑
m1,y2
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2)
log
(
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2)
QnY2|v2(y2|v2)PW1 (m1)
·
PY2|v2(y2|v2)
PY2|v2(y2|v2)
)
=
∑
m1,y2
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2)
log
(
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2)
PW1 (m1)PY2|v2(y2|v2)
·
PY2|v2(y2|v2)
QnY2|v2(y2|v2)
)
(α)
=
∑
m1,y2
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2) log
(
PW1,Y2|v2(m1,y2|v2)
PW1(m1)PY2|v2(y2|v2)
)
+
∑
y2
PY2|v2(y2|v2) log
(
PY2|v2(y2|v2)
QnY2|v2(y2|v2)
)
=I(W1;Y
n
2 |v2) + D(PY2|v2 ||Q
n
Y2|v2
), (15)
in (α) we used that PY2|V2(y2|v2) =
∑
m1
P (m1,y2|v2).
Remark 4: The expansion in (15), reveals that (13) ad-
dresses not only the strong secrecy notation by bounding
I(W1;Y
n
2 |v2), but also bounds D(PY2|v2||QnY2|v2) which cor-
responds to stealth of the communication.
Based on chain rule for informational divergence we have,
D(PW1,Y2|v2 ||PW1Q
n
Y2|v2
) = (16)
D(PW1 ||PW1) + D(PY2|v2,W1 ||Q
n
Y2|v2
|PW1),
where, according to the definition of D(·‖·) in (1), the first
term above equals to zero, thus we proceed with bounding
D(PY2|v2,W1 ||Q
n
Y2|v2
|PW1). The following lemma provides an
upperbound on D(P‖Q), which is useful for the rest of the
proof.
Lemma 1: For probability distributions P and Q, defined
on a finite set A, with P ≪ Q, we have,
D(P‖Q) ≤ log
1
πQ
(17)
where, πQ = min{Q(a) : Q(a) > 0}.
Taking expectation with respect to (V n1 , V n2 ) of
1(φτ = (1, 1))D(PY2|V2,W1 ||Q
n
Y2|V2
|PW1) yields,
E
[
1(φτ = (1, 1))D(PY2|V2,W1 ||Q
n
Y2|V2
|PW1)
] (18)
≤ Pr
(
φτ = (1, 1)
)
log
1
(πQY2|V2 )
n
= Pr
(
φτ = (1, 1)
)
(−n) log(πQY2 |V2 )
≤ 2−nα (19)
for all sufficiently large n, where 1(·) is an indicator function
and we apply lemma 1 in (18). The last inequality comes
from the mutual covering lemma (cf. [10] for example), where
α > 0 is a constant independent of n. With (16) and (19),
therefore, we have for all sufficiently large n
E[D(PY2|W1,v2 ||QY2|v2|PW1 )] ≤ (20)
E
[
1(φτ 6= (1, 1))D(PY2|v2,W1 ||QY2|v2 |PW1) + 2
−nα.
Hence, in the following we focus on bounding the first term
in the right hand side of (20).
We take the expectation over the Y n2 , V1, W1 and S1; we
obtain
E[D(PY2|W1,v2 ||Q
n
Y2|v2
|PW1 )]
= E
[
log
∑J1
s1=1
P (Y n2 |V
n
1 (W1, s1),v2)
J1Q
n
Y2|v2
(Y n2 |v2)
]
=
∑
m1,s1
1
J1M1
E
[
log
∑J1
i=1 P (Y
n
2 |V
n
1 (m1, i),v2)
J1Q
n
Y2|v2
(Y n2 |v2)
∣∣∣∣
W1 = m1, S1 = s1
]
≤
∑
m1,s1
1
J1M1
E
[
log
P (Y n2 |V
n
1 (m1, s1),v2)
J1Q
n
Y2|v2
(Y n2 |v2)
(21)
+
J1 − 1
J1
∣∣∣∣W1 = m1, S1 = s1
]
≤
∑
m1,s1
1
J1M1
E
[
log
P (Y n2 |V
n
1 (m1, s1),v2)
J1Q
n
Y2|v2
(Y n2 |v2)
+ 1
∣∣∣∣
W1 = m1, S1 = s1
]
= E
[
log
(
P (Y n2 |V
n
1 ,v2)
J1Q
n
Y2|V2
(Y n2 |v2)
+ 1
)]
, (22)
where, in (21) we used Jensen’s inequality applied to the part
of the expectation over V n1 (m1, i) for i 6= s1. 2.
Before proceeding with the bounds on the informational
divergence, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Let PV1,V2,Y2(y2, v2, v1) =
PV1,V2(v1, v2)PY2|V1,V2(y2|v1, v2) be a probability distribution
on Y2 × V1 × V2. For ǫ ∈ (0, 12 ) and distribution
Q(y2|v2) :=
∑
v1
PV1(v1)PY2|V1,V2(y2|v1, v2) (23)
it holds for (v2,y2) = T nǫ (PV2,Y2) that
Qn(y2|v2) ≥ 2
−n(H(Y2|V2)+I(V1;V2)+δ(ǫ)) (24)
with δ(ǫ) > 0 and limǫ→0 δ(ǫ) = 0.
Proof: According to Lemma 2.6 in [13] we have for all
(Y2, V2),
Qn(y2|v2) = 2
−n(H(P eV2,Y2 )−H(P
e
V2
)+D(P eV2,Y2‖P
e
V2
Q)) (25)
where,
1) P eV2,Y2 denotes the empirical distribution or type of the
sequence pair (v2,y2)
2) P eV2 is the empirical distribution generated by the se-
quence v2
3) the distribution P eV2Q is the joint distribution computed
with respect to P eV2 and Q
Uniform continuity of the entropy (Lemma 2.7 in [13]),
(v2,y2) = T
n
ǫ (PV2,Y2), and the fact that ǫ ∈ (0, 12 ), yield
|H(P eV2,Y2)−H(P
e
V2)−H(Y2|V2)| ≤ δ1(ǫ), (26)
where, δ1(ǫ) > 0 with limǫ→0 δ1(ǫ) = 0. Moreover,
|D(P eV2,Y2‖P
e
V2Q)−D(PV2,Y2‖PV2Q)| ≤ δ2(ǫ), (27)
with δ2(ǫ) > 0 and limǫ→0 δ2(ǫ) = 0.
Inequality (27) can be seen as follows: In a first step we show
that P eV2,Y2 ≪ P
e
V2
Q. To this end we assume
P eV2Q(v2, y2) = P
e
V2(v2)Q(y2|v2) = 0.
Then either P eV2(v2) = 0 and then P
e
V2,Y2
(v2, y2) = 0
automatically. Or Q(y2|v2) = 0 and then
0 =Q(y2|v2) (28)
=
∑
v1
PV1(v1)PY2|V1,V2(y2|v1, v2)
≥
∑
v1
PV1,V2(v1, v2)PY2|V1,V2(y2|v1, v2)
=
∑
v1
PV1,V2,Y2(v1, v2, y2)
=PV2,Y2(v2, y2),
which, again, implies P eV2,Y2(v2, y2) = 0 by definition of
typical sequences, and thus P eV2,Y2 ≪ P
e
V2
Q. Since P eV2,Y2 ≪
2A detailed proof of this derivation is due to journal version of this work
P eV2Q we have
D(P eV2,Y2‖P
e
V2Q) (29)
=
∑
v2,y2
P eV2,Y2(v2, y2) logP
e
V2,Y2(v2, y2)
−
∑
v2,y2
P eV2,Y2(v2, y2) logP
e
V2(v2)
−
∑
v2,y2
P eV2,Y2(v2, y2) logQ(y2|v2)
and applying again the uniform continuity of entropy along
with the properties of typical sequences we obtain (27).
To proceed with the proof we need to show,
D(PV2,Y2‖PV2Q) ≤ I(V1, V2). (30)
This inequality can be derived as follows,
D(PV2,Y2‖PV2Q)
=
∑
a,b
PV2,Y2(a, b) log
PV2,Y2(a, b)
PV2(a)
∑
c PV1(c)PY2|V1,V2(b|c, a)
=
∑
c,a,b
PV1,V2,Y2(c, a, b) log
∑
c PV1,V2,Y2(c, a, b)∑
c PV2(a)PV1 (c)PY2|V1,V2(b|c, a)
≤
∑
c,a,b
PV1,V2,Y2(c, a, b) log
PV1,V2,Y2(c, a, b)
PV2(a)PV1(c)PY2|V1,V2(b|c, a)
(31)
=
∑
c,a,b
PV1,V2,Y2(c, a, b) log
PV1,V2(c, a)PY2|V1,V2(b|c, a)
PV2(a)PV1(c)PY2|V1,V2(b|c, a)
=
∑
c,a,b
PV1,V2,Y2(c, a, b) log
PV1,V2(c, a)
PV2(a)PV1(c)
=
∑
c,a
PV1,V2(c, a) log
PV1,V2(c, a)
PV2(a)PV1(c)
=I(V1, V2), (32)
where, (31) is by the Log-Sum-Inequality (Lemma 3.1 in [13]).
Combining (26), (27), and (32) leads to the claim of the
lemma.
The expression (22) can be split up as follows: (Recall that
the expectation is taken over those codewords with φτ 6= (1, 1)
∑
v1
(v1,v2)∈T
n
ǫ
PnV1(v1)
∑
y2
PnY2|V1,V2(y2|v1,v2)
log
(
PnY2|v2,v1(y2|v2,v1)
J1Q
n
Y2|v2
(y2|v2)
+1
)
= e1 + e2
where,
e1 :=
∑
v1
(v1,v2)∈T
n
ǫ
PnV1(v1)
∑
y2
(v1,v2,y2)/∈T
n
ǫ
PnY2|V1,V2(y2|v1,v2)
log
(
Pn(y2|v2,v1)
J1Qn(y2|v2)
+ 1
)
(33)
e2 :=
∑
v1
(v1,v2)∈T
n
ǫ
PnV1(v1)
∑
y2
(v1,v2,y2)∈T
n
ǫ
PnY2|V1,V2(y2|v1,v2)
log
(
Pn(y2|v2,v1)
J1Qn(y2|v2)
+ 1
)
(34)
We upperbound e1 in (33) as
e1 ≤
∑
v1
(v1,v2)∈T
n
ǫ
PnV1(v1)
∑
y2
(v1,v2,y2)/∈T
n
ǫ
PnY2|V1,V2(y2|v1,v2) log
(
(
1
πY2|V2
)n + 1
)
≤ 2|Y2||V1||V2|2
−2nǫ2π2(Y2|V1,V2)(−n) log(πY2|V1). (35)
where πY2|V2 and πY2|V1V2 are derived from (17). The (35)
implies that as n→∞, e1 → 0.
On the other hand, to upper bound e2 in (34) we need to
use the Lemma 2, since, (v1,v2,y2) ∈ T nǫ (PV1V2Y2) defined
on PV1,V2,Y2 . Therefore we have,
e2 ≤
∑
v1
(v1,v2)∈T
n
ǫ
PnV1(v1)
log
(
2−n(H(Y2|V1,V2)−δ1(ǫ))
J12−n(H(Y2|V2)+I(V1;V2)+δ2(ǫ))
+ 1
)
≤
∑
v1
(v1,v2)∈T
n
ǫ
2−n(H(V1)+I(V1;V2)−δ3(ǫ))
log
(
2−n(H(Y2|V1,V2)−δ1(ǫ))
J12−n(H(Y2|V2)+I(V1;V2)+δ2(ǫ))
+ 1
)
≤2n(H(V1)+δ4(ǫ))2−n(H(V1)+I(V1;V2)−δ3(ǫ))
log
(
2−n(H(Y2|V1,V2)−δ1(ǫ))
J12−n(H(Y2|V2)+I(V1;V2)+δ2(ǫ))
+ 1
)
≤2−n(I(V1;V2)−δ3(ǫ)−δ4(ǫ))
log
(
2−n(H(Y2|V1,V2)−δ1(ǫ))
J12−n(H(Y2|V2)+I(V1;V2)+δ2(ǫ))
+ 1
)
≤2−n(I(V1;V2)−δ3(ǫ)−δ4(ǫ))
log
(
2−n(R
′
1+H(Y2|V1,V2)−H(Y2|V2)−I(V1;V2)−δ1(ǫ)−δ2(ǫ)) + 1
)
≤ log(e)2−n(R
′
1−I(Y2;V1|V2)−δ5(ǫ)),
where, δ5(ǫ) := δ1(ǫ) + δ2(ǫ) + δ3(ǫ) + δ4(ǫ). We have to
impose R′1 > I(Y2;V1|V2) + δ5(ǫ) in order to assure e2 → 0
with n→∞. This condition, thus, evokes strong secrecy.
Combining R′1 > I(Y2;V1|V2), and symmetrically R′2 >
I(Y1;V2|V1), (10) and (11), we obtain the rate region as in
the theorem 1.
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